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1. Introduction 
Whatever 
Kai von Fintel 
Massachusetts Institute o/ Technology 
This paper is an extended meditation on issues raised in Dayal 's ( 1 997) paper on 
the role of the morpheme -ever in free relatives (FRs) as in this example : 
( 1 )  There's a lot of garlic in whatever (it is that) Arlo is cooking. l 
(2) There 's a lot of garlic in what Arlo is cooking. 
(3) There's a lot of violence in whatever Parker writes. 
Our immediate intuition about ( 1 )  is that -ever indicates speaker 's ignorance. We 
hear the speaker as signaling that she doesn't know what Arlo is cooking, while at 
the same time asserting that no matter what Arlo is cooking, there 's  a lot of garlic 
in it. The FR without -ever in (2) carries no such signal of ignorance. 
The task before us is to make precise the nature of the contribution of 
-ever in ( 1 ) .  If at all possible, we woulQ like to relate this use of FRs with -ever to 
the one in (3) ,  which seems to call for a treatment of whatever as a universal 
quantifier of some sort. 
Let 's  look at one recent characterization of the speaker ' s  ignorance 
reading of whatever: "In the speaker 's ignorance reading, whatever quantifies 
over epistemic worlds. So in a sentence like Whatever I cooked is green on the 
reading 'Whatever it is that I cooked, it is green' ,  whatever quantifies over 
epistemically accessible worlds in which I cooked something. Such worlds will 
include this thing being green and a tomato, it being green and a potato, and so 
on" (Iatridou and Varlokosta, 1 998) . The obvious idea then appears to be to treat 
whatever as introducing universal quantification over epistemic alternatives. We 
would give (1) a paraphrase like "In all epistemically accessible worlds, there 's a 
lot of garlic in the thing that Arlo is cooking". 
Dayal presents an analysis precisely along these lines. The technical 
aspects of her proposal are as follows: 
(4) Analysis D (Dayal 's Implementation) 
a. whateverj [ • • •  � • • •  ]IP denotes at w = 
AQ "i/ i-alternatives E f(w)(s) [Q(i)(tx[P(i)(x)]] 
where P is the property derived by abstracting over Xj in the IP 
denotation. 
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b.  f(w)(s) = {w ' : \ip [s believes pew) � p(w' ) }  
for a world of evaluation w and speaker s ,  f(w)(s) is the set of worlds 
in which the speaker' s  beliefs about w hold. 
c. a world w' E f(w)(s) is an i-alternative iff 
there exists some w" E f(w)(s) such that tx [P(w' )(x)] :t= tx [P(w")(x)] . 
Following earlier work by Jacobson ( 1 995), Dayal ( 1 995), and Rullmann ( 1 995), 
this proposal starts with the idea that FRs are definite descriptions (what Arlo is 
cooking = the thing that Arlo is cooking) . On top of that, whatever introduces a 
layer of epistemic quantification, which necessitates giving whatever-FRs a 
quantificational type. In essence, whatever  asserts that in each epistemic 
alternative, the sentence without -ever is true . However, instead of simply 
quantifying over epistemically accessible worlds, Dayal employs the new concept 
of i-alternatives . In her prose, she gives the following characterization: i­
alternatives "can differ from the actual world only in the denotation of the FR" 
and "the notion of i-alternatives [ . . .  ] characterizes a world as an alternative iff it 
can be distinguished from another world solely on the basis of the denotation of 
the FR". 
But note that the formal definition in (4) does not really capture the 
desired intuition. Nothing in it ensures that i-alternatives only differ in the 
denotation of the FR. In fact, the set of i-alternatives will be identical to the entire 
set of epistemic alternatives (which can differ wildly depending on the extent of 
ignorance present) as soon as there are two epistemically accessible worlds that 
differ in the denotation of the FR. If there i s  no such variation among the 
epistemically accessible worlds, then there are no i-alternatives . 
Dayal recognizes the latter case. She says that "if the speaker has a belief 
about the identity of the unique relevant individual , there cannot be two worlds in 
f(w)(s) that will qualify as i-alternatives .  The ever FR will be infelicitous because 
quantification will be over an empty domain" . From this, we might conclude that 
Dayal imputes a presupposition to whatever-FRs that the domain of alternatives is 
non-empty . Later in the paper, when she turns to NPI-licensing in FRs, she seems 
to have a different view: " [g] iven a degenerate domain of quantification [ . . .  the 
FR sentence] will come out vacuously true". 
I propose to reformulate Dayal ' s  analysis by explicitly assuming a 
presupposition of uncertainty and by dispensing with the intermediary concept of 
i-alternative. 
(5) Analysis D' (A reformulation of Dayal ' s Implementation) 
whatever (w) (F) (P) (Q) 
a. presupposes : 3w',w" E F: tx. P (w,) (x) :t= tx. P (W") (x) 
b. asserts: Vw' E F: Q (w') (tx. P (w,) (xl) 
WHATEVER 
Here, F is the modal base for whatever, a set of worlds (in the simple case the set 
of epistemically accessible worlds of the speaker of the sentence) with respect to 
which a presupposition of variation and an assertion of epistemic necessity are 
formulated. In words : whatever-statements presuppose that the speaker cannot 
identify the referent of the free relative and assert that the referent - whatever it 
is - has the matrix property in all of the speaker 's doxastic/epistemic alternatives. 
Our example in ( 1 )  will receive a logical form like this : 
(6) AW. whatever (w) (f( w)( s)) (AW. AX. Arlo is cooking x in w) (AW. Ax. there's a lot of garlic in X in w) 
The sentence presupposes that there are two worlds in f(w)(s) which differ in 
what Arlo is cooking and asserts that in all the worlds in f(w)(s), there 's a lot of 
garlic in what Arlo is cooking. 
Before we move on, let me present a curiosity : 
(7) There's a lot of garlic in whatever it is that I am cooking. 
As before, there is a speaker ignorance reading: perhaps I don 't know what I am 
cooking because I am rather blindly following some set of instructions. What is 
interesting is that in addition, there is a hearer 's ignorance reading. The sentence 
could be used when I fully know what I am cooking but am deliberately keeping 
it a secret from you. You can almost hear the teasing tone with which this could 
be said. What this example indicates is that the modal base with respect to which 
the contribution of -ever is formulated does not have to be the speaker ' s  
epistemic alternatives, but can take on other flavors. 
We will now consider two variations on Analysis DID ' ,  one of which 
further develops the idea of presupposed variation in the denotation of the FR, 
while the other comes closer to Dayal 's  informal intuition of i-alternatives as 
differing minimally from each other in the denotation of the FR. 
2. Ignorance (Analysis N)2 
The modification we undertake in this section is motivated by worries about 
whether whatever truly introduces an assertion that universally quantifies over 
epistemic alternatives. One odd prediction of Analysis DID' is that ( 1 )  would be 
false in a scenario where there is in fact a lot of garlic in what Arlo is cooking but 
where the speaker is actually uncertain about whether that is so. Our intuition 
seems to be rather that the sentence would be true in such a case (although we 
might judge the speaker to have merely lucked onto the truth). In response one 
might say that this concern arises in all kinds of epistemic statements, not just 
with whatever-FRs. What after all is the truth-value judgment when a speaker 
asserts it must be raining in a situation where it is in fact raining but does so on 
completely inconclusive evidence? The issue is far from settled in general, it 
appears to me, so we might want to steer clear of it. 3 
29 
30 Kai von Finte1 
A more troubling issue is that Analysis DID' makes clearly incorrect 
predictions for embedded occurrences of whatever-FRs : 
(8) Unless there 's a lot of garlic in whatever Arlo is cooking, I will eat out 
tonight. [:;t Unless I 'm sure that there 's a lot of garlic in what Arlo is 
cooking, I will eat out tonight.] 
(9) I suspect that there 's a lot of garlic in whatever Arlo is cooking. [:;t I 
suspect that I 'm sure that . . .  ] 
( 10) When Emma finds whatever she is looking for, she certainly won't tell 
me. [:;t When I'm sure that Emma finds/has found what she is looking for, 
she certainly won't tell me.] 
As indicated, in none of these cases do we perceive an embedded contribution of 
epistemic certainty to the assertion of the sentence. Furthermore, in all three 
cases, it appears that the presupposition of speaker ignorance as to the denotation 
of the FR projects (as expected) to the matrix level. That is, all three examples 
signal that the speaker doesn 't know the denotation of the FR, but in none of the 
examples is there an embedded epistemic assertion. This contrasts quite sharply 
with what happens when we embed an epistemic must: 
( 1 1 )  ??Unless it must be raining, I will go out tonight. 
One obvious difference is that epistemic must resists embedding in the first place 
while the allegedly epistemic whatever does not. And but once we think about 
what ( 1 1 )  would mean, it seems that we would have an embedded epistemic 
assertion: Unless I 'm certain that it is raining, I will go out tonight.4 
Let us therefore modify the analysis so that whatever does not make an 
epistemic assertion at all. We continue to have a presupposition of variation of the 
FR-denotation across the modal base, but combine this with a simple definite 
description denotation for the FR. This also allows us to give whatever a simpler 
type than before : 
( 1 2) Analysis N 
whatever (w) (F) (P) 
a. presupposes: 3w',w" E F: lX. P (w') (x) :;t lX. P (w" ) (x) 
b. denotes: lX. P (w) (x) 
In a simple example such as our ( 1 ) , the whatever-FR now introduces the 
presupposition that among the worlds in the modal base supplied by context (in 
the normal case, the speaker 's epistemic alternatives) there is variation as to what 
Arlo is cooking - that is, it is presupposed that the speaker doesn ' t  know what 
Arlo is cooking. But on the level of asserted content, the whatever-FR is 
equivalent to a simple FR - it denotes the thing Arlo is cooking. 
WHATEVER 
In embedded contexts, the presupposition of variation/ignorance is 
projected according to the usual principles of presupposition projection. So, in 
example (8) ,  the speaker 's  ignorance becomes a presupposition of the entire 
sentence. The example thus presupposes that the speaker doesn 't know what Arlo 
is cooking and asserts that unless there 's a lot of garlic in what Arlo is cooking, 
the speaker will eat out. This is the correct meaning, so Analysis N has a 
significant advantage over Analysis DID'. 
When whatever-FRs occur in the complement to an attitude verb, a further 
possibility arises: 
( 1 3) Pascal correctly suspected that whatever he was eating was not vegetarian. 
Note that ( 1 3) can be read as involving uncertainty/ignorance on the part of 
Pascal, the subject of the attitude ascription, and not necessarily on the part of the 
speaker (as strongly suggested by the use of the adverb correctly) . This subject­
oriented reading of whatever is fully compatible with Analysis N. All that is 
needed is to allow the option of tying the modal base of whatever to the subject of 
the matrix predicate. Here is a logical form that indicates this : 
( 14) Aw. Pascal suspected in w that 
(�w'. [Whatever (w,) (f(w)(p)) (�w" . �y. P is eating y in w") 1 ) 
IS not vegetanan In w' 
This kind of structure is also possible with a quantified subject : 
(15) Every one of the contestants suspected that whatever (it was that) he was 
eating was not vegetarian. 
( 1 6) AW. every (AX. x is a contestant in w) 
Ax. x suspected in w that 
(�w' . [whatever (w') (f( w)( x)) (�w" . �y. x is eating y in w") 1 ) 
IS not vegetanan In w' 
Analysis N works just fine for (15). According to generally assumed principles of 
presupposition projection, there will be a presupposition that each contestant did 
not know what he was eating. There is no embedded modal assertion. Each 
contestant simply suspected that what he was eating was not vegetarian. 
I conclude this section by claiming that Analysis N is a conservative 
modification of Dayal 's  formal system and captures successfully a number of 
examples that her proposal could not account for. In the next section, we will 
encounter examples that seem to urge a different approach. 
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3. Indifference (Analysis I) 
Consider the following examples : 
( 1 7) I grabbed whatever tool was handy. 
( 1 8) Zack simply voted for whoever was at the top of the ballot. 
In both examples ,  the preferred reading does not signal speaker' s  ignorance. 
Instead, a kind of indifference on the part of an agent is conveyed. I grabbed the 
tool that was handy and I didn ' t  care what tool it was (even though I probably 
knew what it was) . Zack indiscriminately voted for the person at the top of the 
ballot. 
We might try to subsume this indifference reading under Analysis N. Why 
not say that in these cases the modal base that whatever works with is not 
anyone' s  epistemic state but instead an agent' s  deontic alternatives?  Then, the 
presupposition of variation would amount to saying that at least two different 
referents for the FR are compatible with the agent' s preferences. If this approa�h 
could be maintained, it would make for a very pleasing story. The various uses of 
whatever would simply be the product of the context-dependency of modal 
expressions as analyzed in Kratzer' s  well-known system (e .g .  Kratzer, 1 99 1 ) .  Just 
like the modal auxiliary must can take on epistemic readings and deontic readings, 
depending on what kind of modal base the context supplies ,  whatever would take 
on speaker ignorance, subject ignorance, or subject indifference readings 
depending on the modal base supplied. 
Unfortunately, Analysis N does not correctly capture the meaning of 
indifference uses of whatever. Consider ( 1 7) :  What we would predict is that ( 1 7) 
presupposes that there are at least two worlds compatible with my preferences that 
differ as to which tool was handy. First of all , that doesn ' t  really say that I didn ' t  
care which tool was handy. All i t  requires is that my preferences are not so 
particular that there aren' t  two different tools that would satisfy them. I may in 
fact have cared very much which tool was handy: it had to be either my favorite 
hammer or the new wrench I bought last weekend. That doesn ' t  seem right: ( 17) 
conveys a much stronger sense of indifference. And the same goes for ( 1 8) .  If 
George W. Bush, Al Gore, and Ralph Nader are candidates who may well be at 
the top of the ballot, the sentence is not in fact compatible with Zack strongly 
wanting either Bush or Gore (but definitely not Nader) to be at the top. 
Furthermore, the indifference that whatever conveys in these examples is 
not just stronger than what the analysis would predict, it is also not quite directed 
at the referent of the FR. Consider ( 1 8) :  the meaning we perceive is not merely 
that Zack didn' t  care who was at the top of the ballot and voted for the person that 
was in fact at the top. What we hear is that Zack didn' t  care who he voted for and 
that he made his decision based on the criterion of who was at the top of the 
ballot. This meaning is not at all captured by applying Analysis N with a deontic 
modal base. As a final nail in the coffin, consider this additional example: 
WHATEVER 
( 1 9) I had no time to play around, so I grudgingly used whatever email 
program was installed on the computer. 
This sentence clearly suggests that the speaker did have preferences as to what 
email program should have been installed on the computer. Nevertheless ,  the 
example has the flavor of an indifference use of whatever. 
Let me suggest that we should try to derive paraphrases of our examples 
that look like these: 
(20) a. I grabbed the tool that was handy, and if a different tool had been 
handy, I would have grabbed that. 
b .  Zack voted for the person that was at the top of the ballot, and if a 
different person had been at the top of the ballot, Zack would have 
voted for that person. 
c .  I used the email program that was installed on the computer, and if a 
different email program had been installed, I would have used that 
one. 
In essence, the idea is that whatever has a conditional semantics :  instead of 
presupposing variation/ignorance, it presupposes indifference in the sense that a 
minimal change in the identity of the FR referent would not make a difference to 
the truth of the sentence. Here is a concrete statement of the new Analysis I :  
(2 1 )  Analysis I (i-indifference) 
whatever (w) (F) (P) (Q) 
a. presupposes: 'Vw' E minw [F n (AW' . tx. P (w,) (x) ;t: tx. P (w) (x)) l 
Q(w') (tx. P (w,) (x)) = Q(w)(tx. P (w) (x) ) 
b. asserts : Q(w)(tx. P (w) (xl ) 
As before the assertion of a whatever-FR will be identical to the one of an FR 
without -ever. But the presupposition it introduces is quite different from the one 
we had in Analyses DID' and N. What is presupposed is what I would like to call 
i-indifference: all of the worlds in the modal base F that are minimally different 
from w but where the referent of the FR is different from that in w are such that 
the truth of the whole sentence that whatever operates on is still the same as in w.5 
If we assume that the min-operator employed here itself triggers an existential 
presupposition, that is, that it presupposes that there are worlds in its argument, 
we derive as a corollary a presupposition of variation. 
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Let us experiment and apply this analysis to Zack. Here is the logical form we 
need: 
(22) Aw. whoever (w) (f( w)( s)) ( Aw' . AX. X is at the top of the ballot in w') 
(Aw' . AX. Zack votes for X in w') 
We now compute presupposition and assertion: 
(23) Assertion: In w, Zack votes for the person at the top of the ballot in 
w. 
Presupposition: In all worlds w' minimally different from w in which 
someone different is at the top of the ballot, Zack votes 
for that person iff in w he votes for the person at the top 
of the ballot in w. 
The quantification is over counterfactual alternatives which differ from the actual 
world in who is at the top of the ballot but which agree with it in Zack ' s  
tendencies, specifically his basis for deciding who he votes for. 
At this point, I conclude that Analysis I deals satisfactorily with our 
indifference examples . Further, it seems to come quite close to what may have 
lain behind Dayal's original idea of i-alternatives. The whatever-FRs say that in 
worlds that differ "only" in the identity of the FR referent, the truth of the 
sentence is still the same. But instead of postulating that we can construct such 
worlds, we rely on the independently given semantics for conditionals. 
4. Unification? 
What is disconcerting, however, is that we now have two analyses tailor-made for 
two different kinds of examples .  Analysis N works like a charm for ignorance 
uses of whatever and Analysis I deals beautifully with indifference uses. Wouldn't 
it be nice if we could simplify the story? We already saw that Analysis N is not 
well suited to deal with indifference examples .  So, perhaps Analysis I can be 
tweaked to account for ignorance examples? Let us see what Analysis I would say 
about our initial example: 
(24) There' s a lot of garlic in whatever (it is that) Arlo is cooking. 
Assertion: 
Presupposition: 
There's a lot of garlic in the thing Arlo is cooking. 
In all of the minimally different F-worlds where Arlo is 
cooking something different from what he is actually 
cooking, there's the same amount of garlic in what he is 
cooking. 
WHATEVER 
This will in fact work quite well if we are assuming that the modal base F here 
can be identified with the epistemic alternatives of the speaker . If we do that, what 
is presupposed is that across the epistemic state of the speaker the amount of 
garlic in the dish is indifferent to the identity of the dish Arlo is cooking . Further, 
since we can assume an existential presupposition for the conditional operator, it 
is presupposed that the speaker's epistemic state shows variation as to what Arlo 
is cooking. 
In other words, something very close to Analysis N comes out of a special 
case of Analysis I .  Ignorance uses of whatever arise out of giving the conditional 
hidden in the meaning of whatever an epistemic modal base . Our paradigm 
indifference uses arise out of a counterfactual modal base. That's quite pretty and 
related on a grander scale to similar hopes of giving a context-dependent unified 
semantics for epistemic and counterfactual conditionals . 
There are some other cases where the analyses seem to converge quite 
nicely : 
(25) Pick whatever apple you want . 
The use of whatever in such "free choice" imperatives is of course well-known. 
Both of our analyses would derive reasonable interpretations, it appears . Analysis 
N or the epistemic resolution of Analysis I would derive a presupposition of 
ignorance : the speaker doesn't know which apple the hearer wants . When added 
to the ordinary meaning of the permission imperative whose import is that the 
hearer may pick the apple slbe wants, this presupposition would naturally enhance 
the impression that the speaker is giving the hearer a free hand . If the speaker 
doesn 't know which apple the hearer wants but permits herlbim to pick the one 
slbe wants, the permission must be a very liberal one. 
The counterfactuaVindifference resolution of Analysis I might also give a 
reasonable interpretation. The idea would be that the speaker gives the hearer 
permission to pick the apple slbe wants with the presupposition that the speaker 
would do the same if the hearer wanted a different apple than the one slbe actually 
wants . 
Unfortunately, I have to rain on our parade by introducing this stubborn 
old friend: 
(26) Unless there's a lot of garlic in whatever Arlo is cooking, I will eat out 
tonight. 
Out of an epistemic resolution of Analysis I, we would derive roughly the 
following presupposition : the speaker's epistemic state is such that in all 
accessible worlds what Arlo is cooking (and he cooks different things across these 
worlds) has the same amount of garlic in it . That is devastatingly wrong. The 
sentence in fact makes it clear that the speaker doesn't know how much garlic is in 
what Arlo is cooking. Our project of unification appears doomed. 
Here's an idea which may be too desperate to be correct . When we give 
whatever widest scope in this example, we get something that comes much closer 
to being right . The presupposition would essentially be that across the epistemic 
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space of the speaker no matter what Arlo is cooking, the connection between the 
amount of garlic in it and my going out stays the same. And as before, the 
existential presupposition of the conditional operator ensures that the speaker 
doesn't know what Arlo is cooking. That's good, but it comes at a price . We need 
to give the whatever-FR scope outside the unless-clause, which is a strong island 
for all kinds of overt and covert extraction and scope mechanisms . I don't know 
whether this is too high a price to pay .  Special scope possibilities are under 
current discussion for a number of constructions. One perhaps quite close parallel 
might be the claim that for computing the presupposition triggered by even, we 
sometimes need to give it wide scope out of scope islands (Wilkinson, 1 993) . 
Another possible problem with Analysis I surfaces when we try to see 
what happens when an indifference FR appears in an embedded context. An 
obvious example to consider would be something like this :  
(27) Unless Zack simply voted for whoever was at the top of the ballot, he 
must have spend at least 5 minutes in the voting booth. 
My impression is that this example has a (preferred) reading that goes counter to 
the idea we have pursued so far, that whatever is a presuppositional operator only. 
What we observed with speaker ignorance was that it projects out of embedded 
contexts .  But in (27), Zack' s indifference seems to enter the truth-conditions at 
the embedded level . The sentence is read as meaning "Unless Zack indifferently 
voted for the person at the top of the ballot, he must have . . .  " .  So, there appears to 
be a big difference between ignorance and indifference uses as far as their 
behavior in embedded contexts is concerned. Perhaps ,  we should relate the 
possibility illustrated in (27) to the option of similar readings with any: 
(28) Maeve isn ' t  just any lawyer - she is the best in the business. 
But I will leave this to others or at least to another occasion. 
My preliminary conclusion is that Analysis I can capture all readings of 
whatever that we have so far discussed, if (and that ' s  a pretty big if) one can be 
comfortable with saying that (i) when its modal base is epistemic it receives 
widest scope even outside scope islands , and (ii) when its modal base is 
counterfactual its presuppositional content of i-indifference becomes asserted 
content in embedded occurrences . If this proves too much to swallow, we are left 
with an ambiguity between N-whatever and I-whatever. 
5. Extensions 
As promised at the beginning, we have to explore how our analyses fare when 
confronted with generalizing whatever-free relatives like this :  
(29) There' s a lot of violence in whatever Parker writes. 
WHATEVER 
It seems that our example is largely synonymous with a run-of-the-mill quantified 
sentence : 
(30) There 's a lot of violence in everything Parker writes. 
This fact has led many people to suggest an analysis of whatever as a universal 
quantifier over individuals. But then we would be left with no good uniform 
analysis covering also the ignorance and indifference uses that we have been 
concerned with so far. 
Dayal proposes that even (29) falls under Analysis D. The idea can be 
motivated by examples that involve an overt adverbial quantifier : 
(3 1 )  People usually honor whoever is elected. 
Dayal 's  suggestion is that the contribution of whatever is embedded under the 
adverbial quantifier here : 
(32) AW. usually (AO. 0 is contextually relevant in w) 
( Ao. people honor whoever (w) (f( 0 )( s)) (AO. AX. x is elected in 0)) 
The adverbial usually quantifies over contextually relevant occasions and claims 
that in most of those occasions people honor the person that is elected. It can be 
assumed that whatever is given as its modal base the same set of occasions that 
usually quantifies over, i.e. we say that f(o)(s) = the set of contextually relevant 
occasions. The contribution of whatever according to Analysis D' and Analysis N 
would then be the presupposition that among this set there is variation as to who 
is elected.6 Note that with such a modal base, variation does not mean ignorance, 
it simply means that different people get elected in some of the situations 
quantified over. What about Analysis I? We would predict a presupposition that 
in each of the relevant situations people's behavior towards the person who is 
elected is indifferent to counterfactual changes. 
Can this carry over to examples like (29)? The idea would be that there as 
well whatever contributes what it always contributes and that the universal 
quantification is due to a silent generic operator. This is not so implausible since 
we can give quite similar examples where the universal force is present even 
though -ever is absent : 
(33) There's a lot of violence in what Parker writes. 
(34) There's a lot of violence in the things Parker writes. 
I am, however, not quite convinced. One reason to be skeptical is that the 
universal reading of (29) is actually quite fragile. It goes away when we look at 
whatever-FRs with nominal heads : 
(35) ??There's a lot of violence in whatever book(s) Parker writes.7 
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It seems to me that only unadorned occurrences of whatever give rise to the 
universal reading. Furthermore, I was told at the SALT conference that there are 
languages that make even more obvious distinctions between universal whatever 
and ignorance/indifference whatever, such as Hungarian which simply lacks the 
latter (Anna Szabolcsi, p.c .) .  
If it turns out that there is a separate item whatever which quantifies 
universally over individuals ,  it is still possible that in addition to the universal 
quantification -ever contributes a presupposition of indifference, which it would 
share with the other item whatever. 
6. Conclusion 
We have surveyed some occurrences and uses of whatever-FRs that go beyond 
what has been discussed in the previous literature . Most of what we have 
encountered can be captured by variations on Dayal's proposal .  Of course, we are 
left with many open questions and much discomfort about the bumpy terrain. 
Whatever comes next might get us closer to a resolution. 
Endnotes 
1 Whenever it helps to bring out the special nature of the meaning contributed by 
-ever, I will use an embedded it-cleft in the free relative. I will leave it to future 
research to investigate what lies behind the effect of the it-cleft. 
2 N is supposed to be somewhat mnemonic for knowledge. 
3 Westmoreland ( 1 995) argues that epistemic must is not a universal quantifier 
over epistemic possibilities but functions as an evidential label separate from the 
truth-conditional semantics of a sentence. 
4 Note that, unlike whatever-free relatives ,  whatever-conditionals furiously resist 
embedding: #Unless whatever Arlo is cooking, there 's a lot of garlic in it, . . .  
5 For our purposes here, we don't need to worry about details of conditional 
semantics . I have chosen a formulation that is very close to the standard 
Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for counterfactuals .  For a recent exploration of 
variations on this theme, see von Fintel (2000) . 
6 The story according to Analysis D is more complicated. See Dayal ' s  paper for 
some discussion. 
7 Of course, ignorance/indifference uses of whatever perfectly well tolerate 
nominal heads : There 's a lot of violence in whatever book (it is that) Parker is 
writing. 
WHATEVER 
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